Security Layer: Undersea + Cyber + Quantum-Era
Undersea infrastructure is now treated as a critical target class. Design must assume tamper attempts.
Physical Security
Recent NATO and EU focus on submarine cable protection:
| Threat | Mitigation |
|---|---|
| Anchor drag | Route survey, burial, vessel tracking |
| Intentional cut | Monitoring, redundancy, rapid repair |
| Tap/intercept | Encryption, tamper detection |
| Natural hazard | Route planning, burial depth |
Cyber Security
Zero-Trust Networking
No implicit trust across distributed edge sites:
- Every request authenticated and authorized
- Microsegmentation between components
- Continuous verification, not perimeter defense
Hardware Root of Trust
| Component | Purpose |
|---|---|
| TPM (Trusted Platform Module) | Secure key storage |
| HSM (Hardware Security Module) | Cryptographic operations |
| Secure boot | Firmware integrity |
| Remote attestation | Continuous health verification |
Supply Chain Controls
- SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) for all components
- Provenance tracking for critical hardware
- Vendor security assessments
Post-Quantum Migration
The Threat
“Harvest now, decrypt later” — adversaries capture encrypted traffic today, decrypt with future quantum computers.
The Response
Adopt standardized post-quantum cryptography:
| Standard | Purpose |
|---|---|
| NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM) | Key encapsulation mechanism |
| Hybrid key exchange | Classical + PQC during transition |
Migration Strategy
- Now: Hybrid key exchange (classical + PQC)
- Validated: PQC-only where standards are finalized
- Continuous: Crypto agility — ability to swap algorithms without re-architecting
Quantum Technologies (R&D Bucket)
| Technology | Status |
|---|---|
| Quantum sensing | Future upgrade for gravimetric/magnetic anomaly detection |
| QKD (Quantum Key Distribution) | Experimental; geographically constrained; treat as optional |
Key References
- NIST FIPS 203 (ML-KEM, 2024)
- EU submarine cable resilience guidance